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The Case of the Exemption Claimants:  
Religion, Conscience, and Identity 
Steven D. Smith, Reporter*
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWGARTH, 45001 
Per curiam. Pursuant to Appellate Rule 13-6(b), this appeal 
consolidates three separate appeals involving different parties, and 
different facts, but one common issue. In each case, a defendant-
appellant who has been convicted for violating a legal provision or 
duty admits the violation but contends that he or she should have 
been exempted from compliance under the New Constitution. We 
have been directed to no previous decisions of this Court in which 
this issue of constitutional exemptions has been resolved,2 and so 
we consider the cases together in order to achieve a rational, 
consistent, uniform resolution. 
Crisp, C.J. Are citizens (or at least some citizens) entitled under 
the New Constitution to be exempted from complying with a law 
because they have, at least in their own judgment, exceptionally 
strong reasons not to comply? The question is raised on this appeal 
by three different claimants who offer three quite different 
justifications for noncompliance. 
 
*   Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, University of San Diego. I received 
editorial assistance in the preparation of this report from Larry Alexander, Marc DeGirolami, 
Rick Garnett, Jill Hasday, Paul Horwitz, Michael Paulsen, Michael Perry, and George Wright. 
 1. Reporter’s Note: The Supreme Court of Newgarth, although relatively obscure for 
the most part, is noted for one much discussed decision which was reported some years ago 
by an eminent legal scholar.  See Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. 
L. REV. 616 (1949), reprinted in 112 HARV. L. REV. 1851 (1999).  The present case was decided 
by the same court, but two centuries later. (I’m afraid I must follow Professor Fuller in 
declining to disclose how the time travel issues were overcome.) I report the case here 
because the issues discussed by the Newgarth jurists have a strong resemblance to issues 
that are debated in this country today—although, as one would expect, there are also 
significant differences.  In order to call attention to the similarities, I have taken the liberty, 
in various places, of adding notes indicating where parallel discussions or decisions have 
occurred in American jurisprudence and scholarship. 
 2. Reporter’s Note: This issue is fiercely debated in this country at the present time.  
See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); 
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014). For one collection of a range of 
contemporary academic views on the subject, see RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS (Kevin Vallier & 
Michael Weber eds., 2018). 
007.SMITH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  9:58 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
340 
In Appeal #476-13-00, the appellant, who calls himself simply 
Father Edward, is a priest who carries out his clerical vocation in 
the County and City of Durham. On the evening of November 27, 
Father Edward heard the confession of a parishioner, Dick Turpin. 
Earlier that day, Durham police had received a report of a highway 
robbery in which over one million Newgarth dollars had been 
stolen from an armored security vehicle. From a photo lineup, the 
vehicle’s driver had tentatively identified Turpin. The 
identification could not be more than tentative because the robber’s 
face had been partly covered. After police learned that Turpin had 
been observed entering the confessional booth at Father Edward’s 
church later on the day of the burglary, a subpoena was served on 
the priest commanding him to come before a grand jury in order to 
testify concerning any incriminating evidence he may have heard 
during Turpin’s confession. 
Appellant appeared and acknowledged having taken Turpin’s 
confession, but he refused to disclose anything Turpin had told him 
during the confession. Father Edward explained that in his faith a 
confession before a priest is strictly confidential, and that he would 
be violating his solemn duty to the church and to God if he were to 
reveal what Turpin had told him. In the jurisdiction of Durham, a 
privilege of spousal confidentiality is recognized, as is the attorney-
client privilege; but unlike in some of our jurisdictions, there is no 
legally recognized priest-penitent privilege. For his refusal to 
testify, Father Edward was accordingly held in contempt of court, 
and was eventually sentenced to six months in prison. He contends 
that this treatment violated his constitutional right to freedom of 
religion and that he should have been exempted from the legal duty 
to testify.3 
In Appeal #476-13-01, appellant Francis Irenic was convicted of 
violating the Newgarth Military Conscription Act, which requires 
all men upon reaching the age of eighteen to register and make 
 
 3. Reporter’s Note: This precise issue was considered in People v. Philips, N.Y. Ct. 
Gen. Sess. (June 14, 1813), reprinted in MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL ET AL., RELIGION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 139 (3d ed. 2011). The subject has received some attention in modern legal 
scholarship. See, e.g., 1 KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREE EXERCISE 
AND FAIRNESS 246–60 (2006); Michael J. Mazza, Comment, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-
Penitent Privilege?, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 171 (1998). 
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themselves available for military service. The Act contains a variety 
of exemptions, including exemptions for men preparing for the 
medical profession and men who are married and have dependent 
children. It also exempts from military service men who have a 
religious objection to serving in war; “religious” is defined as being 
based in beliefs about duties to a “Supreme Being.”4 Irenic refused 
to register or to make himself available for military service, stating 
that he had an earnest and categorical moral objection to war in any 
form. He did not attempt to bring himself within the statute’s 
religious exemption, however, because as he explained, his 
objection is based not on any belief in duties to God, or to a 
Supreme Being, but rather on his commitment to the sanctity of 
human life.5 
Irenic’s conscription board rejected his request for an 
exemption. He nonetheless persisted in his refusal to register or 
serve, and he was accordingly convicted of violating the Act and 
was sentenced to five years in prison. 
In Appeal #476-13-02, appellant Emilia Pescar was convicted of 
violating regulation 17.6 of Newgarth’s Hunting and Fishing Code. 
The regulation makes it a misdemeanor to fish in any of Newgarth’s 
lakes, rivers, or streams, except during fishing season, which the 
Office of Wildlife specified as running from May 1 through 
September 31. Pescar was cited for fly-fishing on the Big Bonanza 
River on November 13. 
In her appearance before a magistrate judge, Pescar pleaded to 
be excused from compliance with the law. She explained that for 
her, fishing is not a livelihood or business; neither is it merely a 
hobby or avocation. On the contrary, for as long as she can 
remember going back to her childhood, fishing has been the core of 
her identity, or her sense of who she is, and she explained in vivid 
 
 4. Reporter’s Note: The Newgarth draft law thus appears to be similar to the 
applicable American law at the time of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
 5. Reporter’s Note: The appellant’s pacifist commitment thus appears to be similar 
to that declared by the defendant Elliot Welsh in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).  
Welsh explained: 
I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living; therefore I will not 
injure or kill another human being. This belief (and the corresponding ‘duty’ to 
abstain from violence toward another person) is not ‘superior to those arising from 
any human relation.’ On the contrary: it is essential to every human relation. 
Id. at 343 (emphasis omitted). 
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and often poetic detail how fishing defines her as a person.6 
Although it would also be accurate to say of Pescar that she is a 
Newgarthian, a woman, a sister and aunt, a Sagittarius, a lover of 
classical music, a Giants fan, a cook, and any number of other 
things, in her self-conception, she does not think of herself 
primarily in those terms: she thinks of herself as a fisher. Hence, to 
ask her to fish only from May through September, she contended, 
is in essence to require her to deny or suspend her identity—to 
forego being the person she is—during more than half of each year. 
The magistrate judge listened to this explanation and then 
commented,  
 I have no doubt, Ms. Pescar, that you are sincere and 
passionate about everything you’ve told me, and I can honestly 
say that I sympathize with you. As it happens, I do a bit of fly-
fishing myself, and if I let myself, I can imagine this becoming a 
kind of consuming passion for me as well. If there were some way 
to allow you—and only you—to violate the fishing regulations, I 
would happily excuse you. But the regulations serve a valuable 
and legitimate purpose—without such limits our supply of fish 
would rapidly be depleted—and there is no legal basis for 
singling you out for an exemption. And so, I must reluctantly find 
you guilty of a misdemeanor.  
The judge then imposed a fine of $50, which is the minimum 
sanction allowed under the regulations. 
All three of these appellants ask to be excused for their 
violations under the New Constitution (which is today something 
of a misnomer because of course the instrument is now several 
centuries old; but it is nonetheless “new” relative to the American 
Constitution on which it was modeled after the old legal order 
collapsed during the Great Spiral).7 Of course, there will always be 
citizens—often thousands or even millions of them—who would 
like to be excused from complying with virtually any law the 
 
 6. Reporter’s Note: A lengthy appendix to the Court’s decision sets forth a transcript 
containing appellant’s explanation.  Because of its length I have not reproduced it here.  
However, American readers may get a sense of Pescar’s conception of herself and of fishing 
by reading (or watching the film adaptation of) NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH 
IT (1976). 
 7. Reporter’s Note: Just what the “Great Spiral” consisted of is unclear, to me at least, 
but the event is referenced in Fuller, supra note 1, at 622. 
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government enacts. Sometimes they have good and legitimate 
reasons for wishing to be excused; and any one of us is likely to 
sympathize with some of their pleas. 
But to excuse citizens from their duty to obey the law—just 
because they think they have a good reason for disobedience 
—would be an invitation to anarchy: it would be to make every 
woman or man a law unto herself or himself.8 Nor would it be 
either feasible or appropriate for us as judges to engage in a case-
by-case assessment of the reasons that various citizens may have 
for thinking that the law should be relaxed in their particular cases. 
We can exempt a citizen from complying with a law, therefore, only 
if there is a sound legal basis for such an exemption.9 
And so we must ask whether there is such a basis in these cases. 
The answer to that question—to the legal question, that is—turns 
out to be relatively clear and straightforward. In the first appeal, 
Father Edward invokes Provision 1 of the Newgarth Bill of Rights, 
which (again, following the American Constitution on which it was 
modeled) provides: “The State shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof . . . .” The second part of that provision, generally described 
as the Religious Freedom Clause, has been interpreted to mean that 
the government should accommodate people in the exercise of their 
religious faiths, including by excusing them from complying with 
general laws. See, e.g., State of Weymouth v. Amish Cmty. 
This requirement of accommodation is not and could not be 
absolute, of course. In Abraham v. Isaac, an action seeking an 
anticipatory declaratory judgment, this Court ruled that the state’s 
interest in the preservation of life meant that a father could not be 
excused from the homicide laws despite his sincere belief that  
God had commanded him to sacrifice his son. But if the 
accommodation of a religious commitment is reasonably possible, 
it is constitutionally commanded. Or at least so our cases  
 
 8. Reporter’s Note: Cf. Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (arguing that 
constitutionally mandatory free exercise exemptions would be impossible because they 
would make every man “a law unto himself”) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 167 (1878)). 
 9. Reporter’s Note: A very similar position is energetically advanced in Nikolas 
Bowie, The Government Could Not Work Doctrine, 105 VA. L. REV. 1 (forthcoming 2019). 
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have held.10 See Amish Cmty.; see also Ben v. Hur; Paul v.  
Corinthian Congregation. 
In accordance with this constitutional provision, and with the 
line of cases interpreting the provision, Father Edward should have 
been excused from testifying about what he heard in confession. In 
his mind and belief, such testimony would have been a gross 
violation of his religious obligations. To be sure, like any other 
constitutional right or privilege, this exemption does not come 
without costs. Father Edward might have provided valuable 
evidence; excusing him and other clergy who might find 
themselves in his position means that such evidence may not be 
available. But that is a cost which our Religious Freedom Clause 
commands us to accept. Given the fact that many of our 
jurisdictions have long recognized a priest-penitent privilege 
without incurring catastrophic consequences, it can hardly be 
argued that Durham has an overriding interest in compelling 
clerics to violate their obligations of confidentiality. Nor should the 
constitutional right of religious freedom be deemed less  
valuable than the statutory rights protecting spouses, or attorneys 
and their clients, in which similar costs of unproduced evidence are 
routinely absorbed. 
The judgment against Father Edward should accordingly  
be reversed. 
With respect to appellants Irenic and Pescar, by contrast, there 
is no legal basis for exempting them from compliance with their 
legal duties. I do not doubt the sincerity of either of these 
appellants. If I were a legislator, I might perhaps attempt to craft 
laws that would not burden their conscience (in Irenic’s case) or 
their self-conception (in Pescar’s case). But I am a judge, not a 
legislator, and I find no basis in Newgarthian law for exempting 
these parties. 
I would accordingly reverse the judgment in Appeal #476-13-
00 and affirm the judgments in Appeals #476-13-02 and #476-13-02. 
 
 
 10. Reporter’s Note: In this respect, it appears that Newgarthian jurisprudence is 
similar to American free exercise doctrine from Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), through 
Employment Division. 
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Broad, J. I arrive at the same conclusion as the Chief Justice, but 
by an entirely different (and, I must say, with all due respect, less 
facile) route. 
The cases before us present complicated issues, and it is hardly 
sufficient just to thumb through the text of the New Constitution to 
see whether there happens to be some provision explicitly 
authorizing an exemption. The result of that approach would be an 
unreflective, haphazard, hodge-podge constitutional 
jurisprudence—one captive to the unplanned vicissitudes and 
fortuitous contingencies of our political history—that would have 
little or nothing to recommend it in terms of the fundamental 
values cherished by our law: justice, fairness, equity, and 
rationality. To be sure, our jurisprudence was once characterized 
by this sort of narrow, text-bound formalism. In recent years, 
however, we have come to recognize that the New Constitution is 
not merely a legal code but something more august; it is an 
embodiment (albeit an imperfect embodiment, as all human 
constructions are) of our aspirations to justice and to reason.11 And 
so our challenge and our task as judges is to interpret that 
instrument liberally in order to bring it ever more in line with its 
lofty aspirations. 
In performing that task, we must start by consulting the legal 
text, of course, but we must also read and construe the text in light 
of principles of justice, as developed and articulated in moral 
philosophy.12 If a particular outcome is recommended by relevant 
principles of justice, the text of the New Constitution will usually 
be supple enough to provide a textual basis for reaching the  
just conclusion. 
So, looking beyond the bare text, do we find any principled 
basis for excusing one or more of these appellants from their legal 
 
 11. Reporter’s Note: American constitutional scholars have expressed similar 
conceptions of the American Constitution. See generally, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION (2011); RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (1985); 
LAWRENCE G. SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES: A THEORY OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL 
PRACTICE (2004). 
 12. Reporter’s Note: In this respect, Justice Broad’s approach to constitutional 
interpretation appears to be very much in line with that advocated in RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), and RONALD 
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986). 
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duties? I believe we do. While all three claimants would seem to be 
persons of reflection and integrity who may engage our 
sympathies, one of them—namely, Father Edward—stands out 
because his claim is based on a perceived duty to a Higher Power.13 
His obligations derive from a Source that is, so to speak, beyond the 
jurisdiction of our laws. We might compare him to an ambassador 
of a foreign sovereign. Typically, when such an ambassador 
transgresses our laws we do not simply arrest and incarcerate the 
transgressor like an ordinary criminal, but rather remand him to 
the justice of the sovereign that he serves. 
And indeed, this was precisely the rationale that led to 
Provision 1 of our Bill of Rights. As noted by the Chief Justice, that 
provision was modeled on the First Amendment to the earlier 
Constitution of the United States. Although the origins and 
meaning of that amendment are obscure and contested by 
historians, the legal authorities that construed it typically linked it 
to an earlier and much-renowned law known as the Virginia 
Statute for Religious Freedom, authored by the legendary Thomas 
Jefferson.14 The Preamble to the Virginia Statute set forth its 
rationale, beginning with the proposition that “Almighty God hath 
created the mind free” and that infringements of religious freedom 
are “a departure from the plan of the Holy author of our religion.” 
Jefferson’s friend and political ally, James Madison, explained that 
a person’s duties to God precede and take precedence over duties 
to society.15 Thus, the antecedent to our Provision 1 was explicitly 
anchored in the principle I have referred to above—namely, that 
mundane legal duties imposed by our law should give way before 
duties owed to a Higher Authority over whom our law can claim 
no jurisdiction. 
By contrast, the claims of the other two appellants may or may 
not be meritorious as a matter of political morality, but they make 
no claim to being based on any duties to a Higher Power. The 
 
 13. Reporter’s Note: A similar view is occasionally voiced in contemporary 
scholarship.  See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God: A Theory of Religious Liberty, 
39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159 (2013). 
 14. Reporter’s Note: This statement might be referring to Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 
U.S. 1 (1947), among other possible authorities. 
 15. Reporter’s Note: This statement seems to be a reference to James Madison, 
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments (1785), reprinted in CHURCH 
AND STATE IN THE MODERN AGE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 59–62 (J. F. Maclear ed., 1995). 
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criteria they invoke—namely, morality and conscience (in the case 
of appellant Irenic) and personal identity (in the case of appellant 
Pescar)—are very much within the jurisdiction and competence of 
our legislators and our law. Those legislators are perfectly free to 
consider such criteria and, if they choose, to craft the law or to 
create exceptions in order to accommodate such concerns. In the 
case of the Military Conscription Law, the legislators did create a 
number of exceptions, thereby showing that they were attentive to 
such matters. But the laws in question create no exceptions 
applicable to appellants Irenic or Pescar. 
I would accordingly reverse the conviction of appellant Father 
Edward but affirm the other two judgments. I hope that I have 
made it clear that I reach this conclusion not simply on the basis 
that there is a convenient legal text supporting Father Edward’s 
claim, but rather because there is an exemption-supporting principle 
that applies to Father Edward—namely, respect for duties arising 
from a Source beyond our law’s jurisdiction—that does not apply 
to appellants Irenic and Pescar, sincere as those claimants may be. 
 
Penn, J. With all due respect, reading through Justice Broad’s 
opinion, I feel that I have descended into a bipolar world. The first 
half of the opinion, dealing with the nature of our New 
Constitution and our obligations as judges to construe that 
instrument in a reasoned, principled, justice-promoting way, has 
an admirably progressive and enlightened quality. But the second 
half of the opinion, in which Justice Broad concludes that only 
claims for exemptions based on purported obligations to a Higher 
Power should be recognized, reads like something excavated from 
the Dark Ages. 
Thus, I can endorse without reservation Justice Broad’s 
explanation showing that as judges, we should interpret the New 
Constitution in light of principles of morality and justice in an effort 
to achieve a just and consistent constitutional doctrine. However, 
the specific principle embraced in my colleague’s concurrence 
—namely, the theocratic principle of deferring to duties imposed 
by a Higher Power—seems to me utterly untenable for our 
purposes, and for more than one reason. 
In the first place, the very Provision 1 of our Bill of Rights on 
which the Chief Justice relies, and on which Justice Broad likewise 
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relies (though not, he protests, for its text but rather for the principle 
that underlies that text), explicitly forbids any establishment of 
religion. This prohibition entails that government cannot endorse 
or rely on theological beliefs or propositions; and we have so held 
in previous decisions.16 See Religious Liberty Ass’n v. Stevens; Sch. Bd. 
v. McAllister. But if government cannot endorse or rely on 
theological propositions, then it would seem to follow—a fortiori,  
in fact—that government cannot suspend the operations of its  
laws for particular individuals in deference to any supposed  
Higher Power. 
More generally and more fundamentally, whatever may have 
been the case centuries ago in the times alluded to by Justice 
Broad—the times of the “legendary” (as Justice Broad puts it*) 
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison—it is plain that not all 
Newgarthians today share any belief in the existence of a Higher 
Power. On the contrary, a recent Plowden Survey reports that 57% 
of those surveyed positively reject any such notion, while another 
23% are unsure; only 14% of the respondents expressed an 
affirmative belief in a Higher Power. (The remaining 6% evidently 
declined to take any position on the question.) 
My point, however, is not that religious believers constitute a 
minority. A century or even a half-century ago, the figures might 
have been reversed: those who doubted the existence of a Higher 
Power were in the minority. The crucial point, rather, is that both 
then and now, belief in a Higher Power is not shared. Some citizens 
maintain such a belief; others reject it. But in a just society 
committed to equal concern and respect for all its citizens, public 
policies must be based on shared premises, so that all citizens can 
join together in public deliberation, and so that no one is coerced 
 
 16. Reporter’s Note: A similar view is frequently expressed in modern religion clause 
jurisprudence and scholarship. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES 15 (1997); Kent Greenawalt, Five Questions About 
Religion Judges Are Afraid to Ask, in OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP AND DEMANDS OF FAITH 196, 
197 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 2000); Douglas Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: 
The Equal Status of Religious Speech by Private Speakers, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1986). 
*   [Justice Penn’s Note] Justice Broad’s description may be more apt than he realizes: 
an acclaimed historian has recently argued that Jefferson and Madison were not actual 
historical persons, but rather, mythical figures constructed by later thinkers and politicians 
in an effort to provide legitimacy to the American political order. See RANDOLPH BULTMANN, 
DEMYTHOLOGIZING THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (Newgarth University Press 4497). 
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on the basis of premises that he or she reasonably rejects.17 
Consequently, a contestable and contested belief in a Higher  
Power who imposes duties cannot serve as an acceptable basis for 
public policy. 
This problem is overcome, however, if we regard Father 
Edward’s objection as one grounded in conscience, or in moral 
convictions and commitments. After all, even a non-religious 
citizen is possessed of a conscience; he or she affirms that some 
things are right and others are wrong. Conscience and moral 
judgment are thus things that can be recognized and embraced by 
all citizens, whether or not they are religious. 
Once we understand that conscience is a legitimate matter for 
government to recognize and respect, however, it quickly becomes 
apparent that exemption from legal duties cannot be limited to 
religious objectors; it must be extended to conscientious objectors 
generally. In this respect, appellant Irenic is equally entitled to an 
exemption. His opposition to war is a matter of conscience; it is 
based on a sincere and reflective moral judgment. So, if we approve 
appellant Father Edward’s request for an exemption, we must 
approve appellant Irenic’s request as well.18 
In reaching this conclusion, of course, I do not deny that Father 
Edward’s plea is for him based on his perceived religious duty, or 
his duty to what he takes to be a Higher Power. I merely observe 
that for us, acting as officials of a republic composed of diversely 
minded citizens, it is not the theistic dimension of his claim that is 
relevant. We cannot say—and, fortunately, we need not say 
 
 17. Reporter’s Note: In this respect, Justice Penn’s thinking appears to resonate with 
that of contemporary proponents of “public reason.”  The outstanding example, of course, is 
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (expanded ed. 2005). For alternative elaborations, see, 
for example, GERALD GAUS, THE ORDER OF PUBLIC REASON: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
MORALITY IN A DIVERSE AND BOUNDED WORLD (2011); STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: 
CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY IN LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 39–75 (1990); KEVIN 
VALLIER, LIBERAL POLITICS AND PUBLIC FAITH: BEYOND SEPARATION (2014). For criticisms of 
the public reason position, see CHRISTOPHER J. EBERLE, RELIGIOUS CONVICTION IN LIBERAL 
POLITICS (2002); David Enoch, The Disorder of Public Reason, 124 ETHICS 141 (2013). 
 18. Reporter’s Note: Justice Penn’s position in this respect appears similar to that taken 
by some contemporary scholars. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, On the Constitutionality and Political 
Morality of Granting Conscience-Protecting Exemptions Only to Religious Believers, in RELIGIOUS 
EXEMPTIONS, supra note 2, at 21; Micah Schwartzman, Religion as a Legal Proxy, 51 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1085 (2014); cf. BRIAN LEITER, WHY TOLERATE RELIGION? 64 (2012) (“If matters of 
religious conscience deserves [sic] toleration . . . then they do so because they involve matters 
of conscience, not matters of religion.”) (second emphasis added). 
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—whether his faith in a Higher Power reflects a true belief or a 
lamentable delusion. What matters for our purposes is that Father 
Edward sincerely believes that it would be morally and 
categorically wrong for him to divulge what he was told in 
confession. In that respect, he and appellant Irenic are alike or, as 
we say, “similarly situated.” Both assert claims of conscience. 
Unfortunately for her, appellant Pescar has no similar claim. 
We have no reason to doubt the sincerity or the intensity of her 
commitment to fishing. But even on her own account, she does not 
assert any moral obligation to fish, or to fish outside of the legally 
defined season. She asserts no claim of conscience. Rather, she 
merely explains that fishing is something that is very important to 
her based on her sense of who she is. Many a citizen who would be 
excused from one or another legal duty could no doubt say much 
the same thing. Like Pescar, they may be telling the truth. But that 
is not a truth that justifies being exempted from legal duties. 
My position, like Justice Broad’s, is based on the assumption 
that our task as judges is to make judgments in accordance with 
principles of justice, although the principle I would apply here—a 
principle of respect for conscience—is different from his principle 
of deference to a Higher Power. I recognize, of course, that my 
rejection of text-bound formalism does not mean that I can simply 
ignore the constitutional text. But in this respect, I see no great 
difficulty in the present case. 
Our New Constitution contains, as already pointed out, a 
Religious Freedom Clause. “Religion” is an elusive term with no 
agreed upon meaning. Traditionally the term has been understood 
to refer to theistic belief and practice, but it is today widely 
recognized that there are “religions” that are not theistic 
— Buddhism, for example. I see no great difficulty in construing 
“religion” to encompass all of the earnest, sincere moral convictions 
that we typically associate with conscience. Indeed, we have 
previously said as much, albeit in dicta. See Sidhartha v. State. 
Whether or not we would conventionally describe all of these 
convictions as “religious,” they do at least occupy a similar place 
and perform a similar function for non-believers (like appellant 
Irenic) that theistic beliefs have and perform for believers (like 
Father Edward). That seems to me to be more than sufficient reason 
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to construe our Religious Freedom Clause to cover such matters  
of conscience.19 
For any who might find this rationalization unsatisfying, we 
can easily tie the right of conscience to the “equal treatment under 
law” clause of Provision 7. As we have construed it, this provision 
requires government to treat persons who are “similarly situated” 
in the same way. See, e.g., Rights All. v. Epsilon. In this respect, for 
present purposes appellant Irenic is similarly situated to appellant 
Father Edward: both assert sincere objections of conscience to 
otherwise applicable legal duties. It seems clear, as the Chief 
Justice’s opinion shows, that under the New Constitution Father 
Edward is entitled to an objection; equality means that the same 
treatment must be extended to appellant Irenic. 
Conversely, in this respect, appellant Pescar is not similarly 
situated to the first two appellants. She does not assert an objection 
of conscience. She is similarly situated, rather, to the thousands and 
millions of other citizens who would ardently wish to be excused 
from some legal duty or other, but who can assert no reason of 
conscience in support of this wish. 
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse the convictions of 
appellants Father Edward and Irenic, but I would regretfully 
sustain the conviction of appellant Pescar. 
 
Mego, J. Seeking a suitable principle for resolving these claims, 
Justice Penn argues that Justice Broad’s theocratic principle is 
disqualified because it is not shared in our society. Of course I 
agree. That anyone would invoke that principle in our own day, as 
Justice Broad does, is surprising, and indeed disturbing. I also agree 
that if Father Edward is exempted from his legal duty, appellant 
Irenic must be exempted as well. 
Unfortunately, the principle that Justice Penn would use to 
reach that conclusion is vulnerable for the same reasons that he 
offers in rejecting Justice Broad’s principle. A more careful 
 
 19. Reporter’s Note: In this respect, Justice Penn’s position appears to be similar to 
that taken by some modern scholars. See, e.g., 1 DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
OVERVIEWS AND HISTORY 69–80 (2010); Kent Greenawalt, Religious Toleration and Claims of 
Conscience, 21 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 449, 461 (2013). Justice Penn’s position also appears 
similar to that of the Supreme Court in the Seeger and Welsh cases cited earlier. See Welsh v. 
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965). 
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reflection will show, I believe, that there are admissible grounds for 
exempting appellants Father Edward and Irenic, but these grounds 
extend to appellant Pescar as well. I will first explain why an appeal 
to “conscience” is no more acceptable than an appeal to religious 
duties, and I will then explain why the proper principle in this 
context must be one of respect for personal identity 
I.  
Justice Penn places great emphasis on “conscience,” which he 
equates with judgments about “morality.” And people can make 
judgments about “morality,” he thinks, whether or not they 
associate morality with any Higher Power. In this respect, he is 
surely right. But does it follow that there is any socially shared 
commitment to “morality,” and hence to “conscience”? I believe we 
can only answer that question affirmatively if we indulge ourselves 
in a massive equivocation on the term “morality.” 
It is hardly a novel observation that people in our society 
disagree over particular moral judgments. (Is telling a lie always 
“morally” wrong? Is late-term abortion wrong?) But, more 
importantly, they disagree over what morality even is. People of 
diverse views may use the same word to mean vastly different 
things.20 And once we acknowledge these differences, it becomes 
apparent that there is no shared belief in the existence of anything 
—no single or coherent entity, nor class of desiderata—that we can 
call “morality.” 
Thus, some people associate morality with the will of God, or 
with a providential plan. In this view, to say that “stealing is 
morally wrong” means something like: “God has commanded us, 
‘Thou shalt not steal.’” This way of thinking is congenial, I suppose, 
to Father Edward. To others, though, “morality” is a purely human 
affair; it is based on maximizing happiness for the greatest number. 
So “stealing is wrong” means that stealing will result in a net 
overall loss of (human) happiness. To still others, “morality” refers 
 
 20. Reporter’s Note: Some perceive a similar condition in our own time.  Michael 
Smith has remarked that “if one thing becomes clear by reading what philosophers writing 
in meta-ethics today have to say, it is surely that enormous gulfs exist between them, gulfs 
so wide that we must wonder whether they are talking about a common subject matter.”  
MICHAEL SMITH, THE MORAL PROBLEM 3 (1994).  For a much-discussed diagnosis of this 
situation, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2d ed. 1984). 
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to an ostensible duty of rational consistency: we should act only on 
principles that we consistently want others to follow as well. So 
“stealing is wrong” means that you cannot at the same time steal 
your neighbor’s property and also want your neighbor to steal  
your property. 
And, of course, there are plenty of other views. Among these 
are various more skeptical positions. By one view, moral judgments 
are basically just expressions of emotion or attitude: to say that 
stealing is wrong is to say, basically, “I don’t like stealing,” or 
maybe, “Boo for stealing!” By another view, moral judgments and 
norms are essentially fictions, or noble lies, that society inculcates 
in people in order to induce them to behave in productive and non-
harmful ways—or perhaps, in a darker version, in order to keep the 
weaker in subjection to the stronger.21 
We might try to say that there is still something—some thing 
—we call “morality,” and that all of these different positions 
amount to different conceptions or theories about what that thing 
is. But this is a deeply implausible way of viewing the matter. It 
seems more accurate, and more economical, just to say that the 
same word (“morality”) is being used to refer to a whole range of 
different things or considerations (which may or may not exist) 
— the will of God, the happiness of society, the emotions or 
attitudes people have towards different kinds of actions. 
Once we recognize that the word “morality” is being used to 
refer to a host of quite different things, it becomes apparent that in 
our society there is no more a shared belief in “morality” than there 
is a shared belief in the existence of a Higher Power. If possible, the 
disagreements about morality are even greater, albeit more veiled 
because of the common term “morality.” If society and the state 
cannot act on “religious” premises because these are not shared, as 
Justice Penn persuasively argues, then it ought to follow that 
society and the state cannot act on “moral” premises either, and for 
the same reason. Moreover, as Justice Penn makes clear, 
“conscience” typically refers to a person’s judgments about 
“morality,” or about what is “morally” right and wrong. If we 
cannot say (except by equivocating) that there is a shared 
 
 21. Reporter’s Note: For discussion of apparently similar positions in modern meta-
ethics, see generally MACINTYRE, supra note 20. 
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commitment to “morality,” then we also cannot say without 
equivocation that there is any shared commitment to “conscience.” 
II.  
The situation looks bleak. Still, I believe there is a way out of 
this predicament. We can accept that although in form both 
religious people like Father Edward and earnestly moralistic 
people like Francis Irenic purport to be making statements about 
something outside or independent of themselves (God, or Justice, 
or Morality—whatever it is), these people are, in reality and most 
fundamentally, telling us something about themselves—about who 
they are. Of course, we need not deny that these people believe they 
are speaking of something outside themselves; we need not even 
deny that in this belief they might possibly be correct. But even if 
we are atheists who deny the existence of God or moral skeptics 
who doubt that there is any such thing as morality, we can still 
understand that when Father Edward speaks of his duty to God, or 
when Francis Irenic speaks of his moral duty not to participate in 
war, these men are disclosing something important about 
themselves. They are disclosing beliefs and commitments that 
constitute them as the particular people they are. They are revealing and 
asserting their identities. 
Moreover, we can acknowledge that there is good reason for us, 
and for our law, to respect people’s basic identities, and to refrain 
from violating or infringing people’s identities. This observation 
rests on a crucial distinction between identity and interests—and on 
the priority of the former over the latter.22 
Most of our actions and decisions affect our and other people’s 
interests—their desires, expectations, or preferences. Now, 
interests inevitably compete with each other. If I invest more of my 
money in a retirement plan, I will have less money available for this 
year’s vacation. If the government spends more on military 
defense, it has less to spend on education. So there are trade-offs to 
be made: and weighing or trading off interests against each other is 
at the heart of what law and government do. And yet interests do 
 
 22. Reporter’s Note: For an emphasis on this distinction in contemporary scholarship, 
see CÉCILE LABORDE, LIBERALISM’S RELIGION 204 (2017); Jocelyn Maclure, Conscience, Religion, 
and Exemptions: An Egalitarian View, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS, supra note 2, at 9, 12. 
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not exist “in the air,” so to speak, or in a void. The very possibility 
of interests depends on persons who possess those interests. Persons 
are essential and primary; interests are derivative. And so an injury 
to those persons—to their identities—is of a different order than a 
mere denial of interests. 
The basic point can be made in contractarian terms for those 
who find illumination in that way of thinking (which of course was 
hugely influential in pre-Spiral political theorizing). Suppose that 
in a state of nature or in a pre-political state, we were to deliberate 
and negotiate about how to form a social contract for our mutual 
benefit. As presumptively rational agents, what would you or I give 
up, or what would we risk, in exchange for the benefits of a civil 
and political order? 
You might well find it beneficial to sacrifice various interests, 
even including interests that you might describe as liberties, in 
order to obtain the blessings of government and rule of law, with 
the security and order that these would bring. But you could hardly 
agree to sacrifice your identity, no matter how great the benefits. 
Because having lost your identity, you would no longer be there to 
enjoy those benefits. As an old saying of unknown origins put it: 
“What doth it profit a man to gain the whole world and lose his 
own soul?” 
Unlike commitments to a Higher Power or to conscience, the 
commitment to what I might call the integrity of identity is truly 
shared by everyone in our society. Not everyone believes in God 
(much less in the God of Father Edward). Not everyone believes in 
morality in any meaningful, non-equivocating sense, and without 
a shared commitment to morality there is no shared commitment 
to conscience. But everyone has an identity. Because without an 
identity, a person would not be a person. Put it this way: if  
someone denies having an identity, she has declared herself to be 
nobody, and has thereby disqualified herself from participating in 
the discussion. 
So if there is any principle that can help us resolve these claims 
for exemptions, it is not the theocratic principle, nor the principle 
of freedom of conscience. Rather it is the principle of the integrity 
of identity. And it follows that a crucial distinction for sorting out 
the various reasons people have for wishing to be excused from 
complying with their legal duties is the distinction between claims 
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based on infringement of identity and claims based on the 
impairment of interests. The person who says, sincerely, that 
compliance will violate or infringe her identity is in a very different 
and much stronger position than the person who says that 
compliance will be costly, or inconvenient, or painful. 
But applying this distinction leads us to a result quite different 
from those favored by my colleagues. Appellant Pescar has 
earnestly and lucidly explained how being a fisher is central to her 
conception of herself—to her identity. Her claim for an exemption 
from the fishing regulation is accordingly very strong. It is surely 
as strong as those of appellants Father Edward and Irenic. After all, 
those parties have not even made any explicit claims about identity. 
We can credit their claims only by inferring that when Father 
Edward talks about God and when Francis Irenic talks about 
conscience and moral duty, they are telling us something about 
how they are constituted—about what is core to their identities. 
That is a plausible enough inference, I think, and so I am happy to 
recognize exemptions for them. Even so, their claims are surely no 
stronger than that of Emilia Pescar, who spoke emphatically and 
explicitly in terms of her self-conception or identity. 
In reaching this conclusion, I am not averse to talking about and 
recognizing a “freedom of religion” (which is to be sure explicitly 
set forth in our New Constitution) or a “freedom of conscience” 
(which is not explicitly acknowledged but is without doubt a 
venerable concept in our tradition). I merely urge that we 
acknowledge that those rights or commitments have their 
grounding in the principle of the integrity of identity.23 And I urge 
 
 23. Reporter’s Note: In justifying religious freedom and freedom of conscience in 
terms of a more fundamental commitment to personal identity, Justice Mego’s position 
resembles one taken in a good deal of contemporary scholarship, jurisprudence, and legal 
advocacy. See, e.g., Brief of Christian Legal Society et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioners at 9–11,  Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 
1719 (2018) (No. 16-111); ROBERT AUDI, DEMOCRATIC AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF 
CHURCH AND STATE 42, 71 (2011); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE 
APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 293 (1999); AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 151–91 
(2009); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 67–68 (1996); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Accommodation and the Welfare State, 38 
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 103, 113–18 (2015); Troy L. Booher, Finding Religion for the First 
Amendment, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 469, 471–72 (2004); Alan Brownstein, Gays, Jews, and Other 
Strangers in a Strange Land: The Case for Reciprocal Accommodation of Religious Liberty and the 
Right of Same-Sex Couples to Marry, 45 U. S.F. L. REV. 389, 400–02 (2010); David B. Cruz, 
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as well that we give effect to that principle even when there does 
not happen to be a clear textual basis for invoking it in a given case. 
For those who demand such a textual basis, I would be happy 
enough to resort to the “equal treatment of the law” clause of 
Provision 7, as generally explained by Justice Penn but adjusted in 
accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. 
I would accordingly reverse all judgments below and would 
grant the exemptions claimed by all appellants. 
 
Kharossiv, J. In her impressive and elegant opinion, Justice 
Mego has reduced this line of reasoning and jurisprudence to its 
logical conclusion—or rather, I might say, to its inevitable reductio 
ad absurdum. Indeed, in a rough way, my colleagues’ opinions track 
the reductionist historical course of our jurisprudence. 
Start with the idea that was once unapologetically asserted by 
the founders (whether real or legendary) of this line of our 
jurisprudence: namely, that our law should exempt those who  
act, as they suppose, from duty to a Higher Power. Can that idea  
serve to distinguish some exemption claims from others, as Justice 
Broad contends? 
Apparently not. Or at least, so Justices Penn and Mego tells us; 
Justice Mego is shocked—yes, shocked—that anyone “in our own 
day” would even suggest the possibility. Now, as an aside, I might 
observe that in the abstract, I am not sure why what Justice Mego 
deprecatingly calls “the theocratic principle” cannot serve as a basis 
for law. It is true that the idea is one that many today, including 
myself, would find woefully unpersuasive, because we do not 
believe that there is any Higher Power. And yet many of our fellow 
 
Disestablishing Sex and Gender, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2002); Rebecca Redwood French, From 
Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, and Postmodern Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law, 
41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 77–78 (1999); Christie Hartley & Lori Watson, Political Liberalism and 
Religious Exemptions, in RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS, supra note 2, at 97, 106–07; Kenneth L. Karst, 
Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REV. 303, 357 (1986); 
Douglas Laycock, The Wedding-Vendor Cases, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 49, 61 (2018); 
Maclure, supra note 22, at 11; Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality, and Special Treatment, 9 
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 344–45 (2001); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 
2593 (2015) (articulating that the Constitution protects right of “persons, within a lawful 
realm, to define and express their identity”); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 636 
(2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“A person’s response to [religious] doctrine, language, and 
imagery . . . reveals a core aspect of identity—who that person is and how she faces  
the world.”). 
007.SMITH_FIN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/13/19  9:58 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2019 
358 
citizens do believe the idea, and it is arguable that the idea is 
embedded in aspects of our law, including the Religious Freedom 
Clause. As it happens, many of our laws are based on ideas that I 
myself do not believe; but they are laws nonetheless. 
More generally, and with apologies, it seems to me that in 
maintaining that a society or a government can permissibly act only 
on premises shared by all of its citizens, my more sanguine 
colleagues consign themselves to a fantasy world. Consistently 
applied in a highly pluralistic society like ours, this notion would 
quickly issue in political paralysis; and so, of course, the notion is 
not consistently applied, but rather becomes an occasion for 
sophistry and hypocrisy. The claim that premises need to be shared 
by all citizens gets watered down into something like a requirement 
that the sharing extend to all reasonable citizens, at which point it 
becomes faintly ridiculous: a reasonable person seems to mean little 
more than “a person who thinks more or less in the way I do.” For 
myself, I believe my church-going neighbor is profoundly mistaken 
in her beliefs; but so far as I can tell she is no less “reasonable”—no 
less intelligent, sensible, or sociable—than I am. With all due 
respect, I cannot help but suspect that my colleagues who talk 
about a “community” constituted around “shared premises” or 
“shared values” are indulging in the same sort of wishful thinking 
and projection that they so often ascribe to the “sectarian” folks 
they disdain. 
But these are cavils. The pertinent fact is not legal or 
philosophical but rather sociological: whether or not it is excluded 
by Provision 1 or by some requirement of shared premises, the 
theistic principle has come to seem unacceptable. In this respect, I 
accept Justices Penn’s and Mego’s views as authoritative—not 
because those views are compelling on their merits, but because the 
Justices who hold them are typical of our governing classes. 
And so we begin by reducing the basis for exemption (as Justice 
Penn does) into a respect for conscience and morality. Upon further 
examination and experience, though, this position also comes to 
seem inadequate, and so (as Justice Mego’s opinion nicely reflects) 
we dissolve conscience into something supposedly even more 
elemental—selfhood, integrity, or personal identity. With identity, 
Justice Mego believes she has reached bedrock.  But when subjected 
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to the pressure of examination, the bedrock turns out to be as 
shifting and insubstantial as sand in a desert storm. 
“Personal identity” is after all the most elusive of concepts. Any 
person—any Tom, Dick, or Harriet—is made up of countless 
attributes or features: physical features like height and weight and 
hair color, cognitive or mental features including knowledge and 
beliefs and language, emotional features or personality traits like 
cheerfulness or stinginess. The list could go on and on. So, among 
all these myriad features, which ones constitute the person’s 
“identity”? 
All of them? Then, if any single feature changes, is the old 
identity replaced by a new one? Every time I get a haircut or clip 
my fingernails I become a new person with a new identity? How 
utterly disorienting! This view being manifestly untenable, we 
evidently are to suppose that some of the person’s features are 
identity-constituting and others are merely incidental.  But then 
how do we know—how does the person herself know—which 
features constitute identity and which are incidental, perhaps 
bearing only upon a person’s “interests”? 
My recollection from undergraduate days is that the problem of 
personal identity is one that philosophers have struggled with, but 
without discernible success. What is it (if anything) that allows us 
to say that the ninety-year-old Charles has the same identity, or is 
“the same person,” as the one-year-old Chucky, even though 
scarcely a single physical or cognitive feature of the infant remains 
in the elderly man. Perhaps nothing: personal identity may be (as 
some philosophers think) a kind of illusion. Or, if we find that 
conclusion too dispiriting, we might look to, say, bodily 
continuity—or perhaps continuity of memory—as the most 
promising answers. But each of these answers invites telling 
objections; I need hardly review them here. And in any case, neither 
the physical nor psychological accounts of personal identity will 
help any of the appellants in this case. After all, none of those 
parties contends that compliance with the legal duties to which 
they object will interrupt their bodily continuity or their memory of 
events in their personal histories. 
Perhaps Father Edward might offer us some account of 
personal identity in terms of a ghostly immortal soul, or something 
of that sort. But although (unlike Justices Penn and Mego) I would 
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not rule out such a theory a priori merely because of its “religious” 
nature, I doubt very much that any such spiritual account would be 
serviceable for our purposes. Or that it would be at all helpful to 
these appellants. After all, so far as I can tell, none of them has 
claimed that compliance with the objectionable duties will 
somehow extinguish their immortal souls. 
Justice Mego offers no philosophical or theological account of 
what “identity” consists of. Hers, it seems, is a more permissively 
egalitarian or perhaps libertarian approach: she seems to be saying 
that every one of us gets to choose for ourselves which features are 
central to our identity, or to our “self-conception.” And why not? If 
my neighbor Joe believes that he is essentially a golfer, or a 
flautist—if he believes that these features define “who he really 
is”—who am I to gainsay? (Even if Joe can’t hit a fairway to save 
himself and his flute playing is wretched.) And if he tells me he is 
Napoleon Bonaparte, or Caligula, it would be not merely pointless 
but imprudent for me to contradict him. 
And yet . . . people change their self-conceptions constantly. 
People who thought of themselves as being Christians to the core 
become agnostics, and vice versa. People who thought of 
themselves as poets or musicians or incipient novelists learn that 
their talents are disappointingly meager and begin to think of 
themselves instead as teachers, or lawyers, or bird watchers. Have 
their “identities” thereby changed? Do we really think—do they 
think—that they are no longer “the same person”? Would it seem 
other than crazy, for example, to suggest that they should no longer 
be bound by, say, their former debts (or answerable for their former 
crimes) because it was someone else—some other person—who 
assumed those debts, or who committed those crimes? After all, 
what could be more unjust than to punish one person for another 
person’s crimes? 
To be sure, we do sometimes say, for example, that “Mary is a 
new person” ever since she changed her religion, or changed her 
job, or started seeing a new boyfriend. These ways of speech no 
doubt express some sort of metaphorical point. At the same time, 
we don’t for a moment doubt that Mary2 is bound by all of the 
obligations incurred by Mary1, and is entitled to all of the property 
and benefits of Mary1. Nor do we think we need to get acquainted 
all over again. (“I knew your predecessor well, for many years 
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—charming person, although sometimes a bit overbearing—but 
now, tell me about yourself.”) Mary is still Mary. 
In short, changes—even quite fundamental changes that affect 
a person’s self-conception—do not actually result in a change in 
personhood, or in personal “identity,” in any very strong sense of 
the term. To appreciate this point, we need only consider closely 
the claims made by Justice Mego in her eloquent opinion in this 
case. Suppose the government prevents Emilia Pescar from fishing 
during the months between September and May (if necessary by 
putting her in jail). Justice Mego tells us that the government  
would thereby “violate” or “infringe on” Ms. Pescar’s “identity.” 
What does this even mean? That the person who was Ms.  
Pescar will somehow pass out of existence (perhaps to revive on 
May 1 when fishing season begins again)? That seems an 
extravagant characterization. 
Or suppose we embrace the extravagance and say, “despite 
outward appearances, the person going under the name of Emilia 
Pescar from October through April has a different identity—she is 
actually not the same person—as the Emilia Pescar from May 
through September.” So it seems that a person (the summer Pescar) 
has been deprived of existence, at least for half of the year (and 
perhaps forever, if we were to jail her for an indefinite term). That 
seems tragic—because, after all, every person is precious. But then 
again, a new person (the winter Pescar), one who wouldn’t 
otherwise have existed, has been brought into existence. That seems 
cause for jubilation—because every person is precious. Perhaps (all 
persons being of “equal moral worth”) the tragic loss and the 
transcendent gain cancel each other out? 
But then probably, as is usual in these kinds of lofty 
deliberations, I am missing the point. Probably when Justice Mego 
suggests that a person’s identity is “violated” or “infringed,” she 
doesn’t mean that the person and her identity are somehow 
extinguished. Maybe the point is just that the person isn’t permitted 
to live in accordance with her “identity,” or her “self-conception.” 
If this is what Justice Mego is saying, she is surely right. But of 
course, we knew that all along. Now it seems we are just saying that 
the person isn’t permitted to live as he or she really, really wants to 
live, or as he or she thinks he or she should live. That observation 
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merely brings us back to where we started. But where is the reason 
for giving special priority to the claim for an exemption? 
Moreover, it seems to me that on this understanding of Justice 
Mego’s position, she forfeits much of her argument for giving 
special priority to identity-based claims. She argues, for example, 
that identity-based claims must take precedence over interest-
based claims because interests can’t exist in a void; they presuppose 
a person (and hence, she adds, in great haste, an “identity”) in order 
to exist at all. But on the reduced understanding of what it means 
to “infringe” an “identity,” there is still a person in the picture (and 
hence, of necessity, an “identity”?)—a person who can enjoy 
“interests.” 
In a similar way, if I am a rational agent in a state of nature 
negotiating about what to give up in order to obtain the benefits of 
law and government, it may be true that I would never sacrifice my 
“identity” if that means something like sacrificing my life, or my 
personhood. Because then, as Justice Mego explains, I wouldn’t 
exist to enjoy the benefits of law and government anyway. 
(Actually, in my own case at least, I believe I would accept a one-in-
four chance of personal annihilation in exchange for, say, the Taj 
Mahal.) But if we’re only talking about sacrificing “identity” in the 
sense of sometimes not being permitted to live in the way I want to 
live (or, if you prefer, in the way the-person-I-think-I-am would 
want to live), then I might be perfectly willing to make concessions 
in that “identity” column. I might give up a smidgeon of my 
“identity” in exchange for a windfall to my “interests.” Or, to be 
blunt, I might fail any longer to see the pertinent difference 
distinguishing the “interests” column from the “identity” column. 
I recognize that arguments based on selfhood or personhood or 
“identity” are currently fashionable. I think I even understand 
some of the reasons for that popularity. Those reasons are 
conspicuous in Justice Mego’s opinion. In an age of massive and 
seemingly irresolvable disagreements about what kind of God (if 
any) exists and about what “morality” even is (not to mention the 
more obvious disagreements about all manner of specific “moral” 
and “justice” issues), it is natural that advocates, including lawyers 
and judges, would search for some more secure foundation for 
making normative arguments and normative judgments. 
“Identity” has seemed to provide such a foundation to many. 
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Because it seems (as Justice Mego beautifully explains) that every 
one of us has to have, and to value, “identity.” 
Unfortunately, we have no adequate and workable theory or 
account of what “identity” is. And so arguments based on 
“identity” end up trading on the same kinds of confusion and 
equivocation that Justice Mego skillfully diagnoses with respect  
to “morality.” 
My own conclusion is that we have not come up with any viable 
distinction or principle that would permit us to distinguish among 
the multitude of reasons that people have for wishing to be excused 
from complying with their legal duties. Once we’ve rejected the 
“Higher Authority” principle (as it seems we have, whether or not 
we needed to), neither the “conscience” principle nor the “personal 
identity” principle can check our descent. And so our choices, it 
seems (unless we are to give up our pretensions to being 
“principled”—a prospect at which my colleagues shudder with 
horror), are to exempt everybody who wants to be excused from 
complying with a law, or nobody. 
But that is scarcely a choice at all. We obviously cannot exempt 
everybody: as the Chief Justice observes, this would amount to 
anarchy. And so we must exempt . . . nobody. 
This, I think, is where my colleagues’ logic leaves us. Contrary 
to their lofty intentions, it seems, they have convinced me: I accept 
the conclusion of their logic—even if they don’t. I would 
accordingly affirm all of the judgments. 
 
Per curiam. Lacking a majority position or opinion, we have 
had to resort to counting votes. Among five Justices, four (Crisp, 
Broad, Penn, and Mego) have voted to reverse the conviction of 
appellant Father Edward. The judgment in Appeal #476-13-00 is 
accordingly REVERSED. Only two Justices have voted to  
reverse the conviction of appellant Francis Irenic, and only one 
Justice has voted to reverse the conviction of appellant Emilia 
Pescar. The judgments in Appeals #476-13-01 and #476-13-02 are 
accordingly AFFIRMED. 
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ON REHEARING 
Penn, J. (with whom J. Mego joins). 
Appellants Francis Irenic and Emilia Pescar have moved for 
rehearing. Upon reconsideration, I remain of the view that I 
expressed in my initial opinion; and Justice Mego authorizes me to 
say that she would continue to adhere to the views she expressed 
in her opinion. We both agree, however, that an outcome granting 
an exemption to appellant Father Edward but denying an 
exemption to Francis Irenic constitutes an intolerable violation of 
the fundamental principle of equal treatment. Justice Mego would 
reach the same conclusion regarding appellant Emilia Pescar. The 
commitment to equality is fundamental to our constitutional  
order. In order to maintain equality, we therefore deem it necessary 
to deny all of the claims for exemptions. Justice Kharossiv agrees 
with this conclusion. The convictions in all three appeals are 
accordingly AFFIRMED. 
Crisp, C.J., and Broad, J., dissent from this judgment for the 
reasons expressed in their initial opinions. 
 
